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Bulgaria Re-elected the President. So, What? 
Krassen Stanchev 
 
Run-off presidential elections in Bulgaria last 
Sunday have had a predictable winner, the 
incumbent president Georgy Parvanov. Why the 
predictability, and what this result would mean 
for the immediate future of the country? 
On the second round, needed because in the first 
45% of the voter took part, the competition was 
between the incumbent president and self-made 
chauvinist, Volen Siderov, leader of Ataka. 
Ataka opposes privatization, trade liberalization, 
and EU and North-Atlantic identity of 
Bulgaria’s foreign policy. It also claims that 
minorities of Bulgarian Turks and Roma de 
facto exploit the majority of the Bulgarian 
citizens through a) the party Muslim typically 
vote for, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms 
(MRF)*, which by tradition and due to 
consolidation of its voter constituency holds the 
swing vote in the parliament for already many 
years; and b) the free-riding on the governments 
and EU welfare programs. Ataka had surprised 
many if not all political observers’ expectations 
for the last year general elections, by winning 15 
seats in the 240-member parliament. Siderov’s 
key electoral message than was to ban MRF, exit 
Iraq and NATO and renationalize privatized 
industries, thus “Giving Bulgaria Back to 
Bulgarians”.1 Those messages were not amended 
significantly this year, the accent, however, was 
put on “fighting” mafia that was allegedly rooted 
in the links with mainstream political parties, 
including Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), a 
successor of the Communists and MRF. Georgy 
Parvanov was a still remains informal leader of 
BSP. 
Bulgarian citizen usually vote in relatively big 
numbers in presidential elections. The average 
voter turnaround in 1992, 1996 and 2001 
elections for a head of state was 60-70%. On 
October 29th, only 40% took part in the 
elections: Parvanov got ¾ of the vote or about 
30% of the all votes. 
There are four reasons that have made this 
outcome inevitable. 
                                                 
1 See analysis of those elections in the respective 
issues of the Economic Policy Review. 
1. Right of the center political parties have 
suffered a political disease that might be called 
“agenda exhaustion”: they led reforms towards 
multi-party democracy, privatization, restitution 
of nationalized properties and market economy, 
towards joining NATO and the EU. All these is 
successfully accomplished, in 2005 and 2006 
elections they had little to offer and proved 
unable to confront populist rhetoric of Parvanov 
and Siderov. 
2. Bulgaria president is with almost 
ceremonial powers by constitution. He or she is 
to be elected by a popular vote, but the 
institutional functions are to represent the 
country, hand off the mandate to from an 
executive and set a caretaker cabinet in times of 
political crisis and call fresh elections as well as 
the right to return laws back to legislature 
(which than could be passed by 50+1 majority of 
all seats). President Zhelev in 1991 – 1996 
managed to block BSP (holding a sizable 
majority in the parliament before 1997 and the 
executive in 1994 - 1997) attempts to reverse 
property restitution and crackdown on property 
rights and privatization. He and president 
Stoyanov (1997 – 2001), both democrats, have 
been instrumental securing rule of law and 
smooth power transfer in time of political crisis. 
President Parvanov pretended he is “social 
president”, talked much about everything from 
family and raising kids, to migration, economic 
strategy, history and nuclear energy. He 
succeeded in emptying the constitutional content 
out of the presidential powers and substituted it 
with general policy talk. Right-wing candidate, 
Nedelcho Beronov, a former constitutional judge 
had no chance to compete on this grounds. 
Bulgarians simply disagreed with the 
substitution and get tired of the general talk and 
did not come out to vote. 
3. Georgy Parvanov himself was not so 
long ago not very much different from Volen 
Siderov. In 1990-1991 he opposed returning the 
names to the Christianized Turks, sat on the 
board of an extremely; he openly opposed 
NATO accession, demonstrated in the streets on 
the issue and sent a letter of support to Milosevic 
in 1999. He would oppose privatization as well 
if his party were not cutting the gain. 
4. So, the choice in the last October 
weekend was more between the somewhat 
normal populist rhetoric and abnormal 
populist rhetoric, when the former saves the 
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image of the country as mainstream EU 
political system. It was about political 
correctness, and the political correctness is 
the real winner of the elections. 
Bulgarian political observers imagined for a 
moment before the second round that the 
country resembles last presidential elections in 
France when Chirac defeated Le Pen with the 
help of the Socialist voters. Therefore, they 
believed Bulgaria right-wing voters should cast 
their votes in favor of Parvanov. 
Voters did not listen. 
 
What this constellation means for the future? 
1. BSP and Parvanov himself have regained 
some confidence. They run the executive, on the 
MRF mandate2, in coalition with MRF and the 
ex-king’s party, National Movement Simeon the 
Second (NMSS). The coalition holds a 2/3 
majority in the legislature and is able to amend 
the constitution of its own. Within the coalition 
MRF holds ministries that are believed lucrative 
in terms of EU subsidies. The Prime Minister, 
Mr. Stanishev, is personally weak but 
successfully holds the balance between BSP, 
MRF and NMSS interest thanks to the relative 
strength of BSP (with 1/5 of the vote there is no 
other political party to contest the leadership) 
and the help of the three-member (i.e. leaders) 
Coalition Council or “Polit-Bureau”. The “Polit-
Bureau” decides on tricky issues related to 
personal appointments, division of 
responsibilities between the parties and the 
balance of interest and influence. 
2.  The second term of the President Parvanov 
would certainly garnish a greater informal 
weight of BSP within the coalition. It would 
make NMSS tacit criticism on economic policies 
and socialist redistribution even more silent that 
it now. MRF strength is not likely to suffer at 
all. MRF have landed roughly 1/3 of the votes 
that elected Georgy Parnanov. Ahmed Dogan, 
the NRF leader, seems stronger within the 
coalition, less liked by the Bulgarian voters but 
more needed with the Polit-Bureau and the 
coalition to keep mandate. 
3. The self-confidence of BSP and MRF has 
always been next to arrogance. In the first days 
after the election there are all signs of growing 
self-esteem and there are already attempt to 
                                                 
2 In July – August 2005 BSP and all other political 
parties had failed to elect a cabinet, see EPR.   
humiliate right-wing voters and parties. This 
“strength” would not translate, however, into a 
misuse of constitutional majority for lessening 
property rights or increased redistributionist 
policies. On one hand, most of the damage is 
already done and is related to: longer and 
comparatively more disadvantageous (for 
Bulgarian farmers and land owners viz-a-vie 
their palls in CEE) periods and processes of 
foreigners buying arable land in Bulgaria; 
constitutionally protected government 
monopolies and “exclusive rights”; 
inappropriate definition of judicial independency 
and the already enshrined multiple “social 
rights”. 
4. Besides the rhetoric, the rational and the 
political drive for further fiscal and quasi-fiscal 
reforms towards lowering taxes and reducing 
costs of dealing with the government – 
traditionally very high in Bulgaria – will be 
totally lost. Those reforms have suffered already 
but the reestablished political self-esteem would 
more likely support populist lawmaking than 
any other available alternative. 
5. In the area of pure presidential prerogatives 
Mr. Parvanov will be reassured. He met with 
Mr. Putin more times that all post-Communist 
country leaders of Europe have met the Russia 
altogether. Mr. Putin is Mr. Parvanov’s role 
model. Mr. Parvanov, in order to prevent 
campaign disclosures, has publicly admitted that 
he had worked for the Bulgaria analogue of 
KGB, KDS. “KDS” was in fact managed by 
“KGB”. Now, like Putin, Georgy Parvanov is 
trying to glorify those years, gives state awards 
to KDS-collaborators, hoping thus to glorify 
himself and fellow-collaborators. He is perhaps 
the only head of EU state that speaks no EU 
language and attempts to speak Russian. His 
heart lies in Russia not in EU, and he is trying to 
benefit from these sympathies. That does not 
necessarily mean that the country will benefit, at 
least there not such sign after the first five 
meetings with Vladimir Putin.  
6. All above said is no good political 
development. But it is not too bad, either. The 
fact right-wing voters did not supported Mr. 
Parvanov, irrespectively the propaganda, means 
that in the country there is a strong public 
opinion that would support further market 
reforms. It did not find necessary to vote at all, 
especially on the second round. But this opinion 
is there to stay, and even the BSP-MRF-NMSS 
coalition and its president cannot ignore it. 
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* MRF’s name and strength come from the 
Communist past, as a reaction to the stupid 
communist party policies of the mid-1980’s to 
rename Bulgarian Turks, give them Christian or 
quasi-Christian names by force (other Muslims, the 
Pomacks – ethnic Bulgarian - were renamed in the 
1970’s), and expel from the country those who 
publicly disagree with that policy (which eventually 
happened in mid-1989, few months before the 
political change). The new constitution of 1991 
restore the rights, almost all of 300,000 Bulgarian 
Turk who fled to Turkey in May-August 1989 have 
returned back, and reclaimed their names and 
properties; they enjoy freedom of movement, many 
work or live in Turkey, and have the rights to vote in 
Bulgaria. The article 11.4 of the 1991 constitution 
banned political parties built on ethnic and religious 
grounds, thus securing a sort of MRF monopoly on 
the Muslim vote in Bulgaria’s political affairs. More 
information and analysis on this background, 
including constellations of Bulgarian Roma, one 
could find in the IME English monthly, Economic 
Policy Review (EPR, www.ime.bg ). 
 
10% Profit Tax – the Result of Eight Years of 
Efforts of the Institute for Market Economics 
Svetla Kostadinova, Krassen Stanchev 
 
Yesterday’s achievement of the deputies has its 
prehistory. It is not their doing, but a result of 
the demand for such change in the society. A 
leading role in forming this demand has played 
our Institute. Here is a short overview of these 
efforts. 
Present: From 2007 profit tax is set at 10%. 
The Institute for Market Economics has been 
one of the major upholders of low taxes since its 
establishment in 1993. This is proved by the 
attempt for assessment of tax reforms in 
Bulgaria, Slovakia and Poland in 1997-1998 
which also included testing the perspective for 
proportional (flat) low tax and by the permanent 
campaign since 2002 for a 10% proportional and 
generally applied tax. This issue has also been a 
major priority of IME and we have been 
popularizing the idea through analyses, 
suggestions and publications. 
A remarkable part in these efforts had: in the 
period 1997-1998 Latchezar Bogdanov – now 
managing partner at Industry Watch consultancy 
agency, and from 2002 to 2005 Georgi Angelov, 
now working as a senior economist at the Open 
Society Institute.  
IME’s suggestions for tax reform are: 
1. Introducing a single marginal rate of 
10% for the income tax 
For the period 2003 – 2006 the number of 
marginal rates of this tax was reduced, as well as 
the rates themselves. 
2. Reduction of social security contributions 
to 10% 
IME was the first and until recently the only 
organization to claim that a reduction of social 
and health insurances is (completely) possible. 
In 2006 they were reduced for the first time in 
years by 6% and a new reduction has been 
discussed for 2007. 
3. Reduction of profit tax to 10% 
This goal was achieved yesterday, October 12, 
2006 when the change in the law was passed at 
second reading.  
 
What did we do in the last four years? 
2003 
On October 3, 2003, as suggested by Georgi 
Angelov, IME presented for the first time in its 
bulletin an Alternative Budget, which would 
underlie an alternative government policy which 
would accelerate the rates of economic 
development and would lead to an increase in 
the welfare of Bulgarian citizens. The reason 
was the elapsing of the emblematic 800 days of 
the government. A fundamental role in this 
policy has the reduction of taxes and 
contributions and for this reason we prepared an 
alternative budget, which envisioned a reduction 
of the income tax and the profit tax to 10% and 
of the contributions to 16.7 %. 
Again in 2003 IME addressed through open 
letters the prime-minister, the deputy prime-
minister and minister of economy, the newly 
elected director of the Bulgarian National Bank 
Mr. Iskrov, and Mr. Dogan, whose role for the 
stability of the majority in the parliament could 
not be undervalued. Our aim was to provoke 
reflection on some long term aspects of the taxes 
laid at that time, the budget and the financial 
(monetary and fiscal) policy. A similar letter was 
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issued on the next year by some leading 
Bulgarian economics. This act of support is a 
matter of appreciation not only by us in IME but 
by the Bulgarian citizens and firms. (Bulgarian 
citizens and firms also owe them such 
recognition.) As a result of these letters, we 
received an answer from some of the addressees. 
The Minister of Finance: “If we are speaking of 
reduction of taxes, then I am a supporter for 
them to fall even to 5%, and why not 2%. But let 
us be realistic. I am confident that only in a few 
days you will hear from representatives of the 
opposition how little funds are set aside for 
pensions, healthcare, education, for this and 
that. But we should be fully aware of a balance 
between all state expenses and have a 
responsible approach.” 
On November 10, 2003, IME gave a press 
conference on the topic of Evaluation of the 
possibilities and perspectives for reduction of 
the taxes in Bulgaria, for the benefits of such 
policy. At this conference for the first time in 
Bulgaria were presented accounts for the real 
burden on a taxpayer, the effect of reducing the 
taxes on the incomes from salaries and the 
incomes of the self-employed was evaluated. 
 
Realized change: Reduction of profit tax from 
23.5% to 19.5% from 2004. 
Realized change: Reduction of the lowest 
marginal rate on the income tax from 15% to 
12% from 2004. 
 
2004 
In March 2004 more than 100 economists, 
analysts, researchers, finance experts and 
intellectuals sent through IME an open letter to 
the Minister of Finance Milen Velchev and the 
Prime Minister Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, 
declaring the position that a reform, related to 
tax reduction is necessary to be undertaken. 
More particularly, they insisted on the 
introduction from 2005 of a single marginal rate 
of 10% for all direct taxes – income tax, profit 
tax and contributions payments.  
The Minister of Finance answered the open 
letter, expressing partial support: 
“I fully agree with you that high taxes have a 
negative social effect, as a result of which the 
unscrupulous businesses cross into the grey 
economy. I also agree that lower taxes 
"facilitate entrepreneurship and taking risk", 
and increase the ability to attract foreign 
investment...With a continuing financial and 
economic stability in the next years, it is logical 
and expedient to think in the direction set out by 
you.” 
The open letter and the answer form the Minister 
of Finance and other political figures and 
administrators (Jordan Hristoskov, Aliosman 
Imamov, Alexander Bozhkov and other 
opponents to the changes) raised a public debate 
with multiple articles and opinions from 
different points of view. 
In August 2004 representatives of IME and the 
Center for Liberal Strategies gave a press 
conference on the taxes in 2005 and on. The 
conference, like all similar events during the 
years, provoked a powerful response and was 
widely reflected in the media. Two organizations 
– the first one a department of the Ministry of 
Finance and the other one a private economic 
institute – tried to disprove our arguments and 
even to organize a conference against the 
changes proposed by us, but gave up. 
Since 2004, with the assistance of Georgi 
Vassilev – a banker in Geneva and founder of a 
prize for contribution to the freedom of thought 
in Bulgaria (which will be announced later this 
year), IME started issuing a monthly Bulletin for 
low taxes: Flat tax. An editor of the edition from 
2004 to the beginning of 2006 was Georgi 
Angelov, and now it is Svetla Kostadinova.  
Besides being distributed through the e-mail, the 
bulletin is sent by post to all deputies, as well as 
to political parties, media, business 
organizations, trade unions, all ministries, state 
agencies, universities and non-governmental 
organizations. 
In order that people can understand the real 
effect of the changes proposed in the tax laws, 
IME prepared a tax calculator, which shows 
how will the suggestions of the leading political 
parties for changes in taxation impact the 
income of the individuals. It immediately makes 
clear the effect of the suggestions of the ruling 
party National Movement Simeon II, the 
opposition in the face of the Union of 
Democratic Forces, Democrats for Strong 
Bulgaria, Bulgarian Socialist Party, and The 
New Time and makes possible a comparison 
with the suggestion for a flat tax of 10%, made 
by more than 100 economists and intellectuals. 
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On October 29 and 30 the first annual meeting 
of the European Resource Bank (ERB) was held 
in Borovetz. In order to improve the strategies of 
the liberal institutes and to increase the 
interaction between them, a resource bank was 
established in Europe on the analogy of those in 
the United States, Africa and Asia. At the 
meeting there were representatives from France, 
Germany, USA, Italy, Sweden, Great Britain, 
Georgia, Israel, Denmark, Switzerland, Turkey, 
Spain, the Netherlands, Austria, India, Belgium, 
Romania, Lithuania and Russia. Problems 
regarding the encouragement of economic 
freedom as a whole, reduction and simplification 
of taxation, competition between countries over 
marginal rates and its consequences, reduction 
of state expenses through cutting down of the 
administration and introduction of e-
government, fiscal decentralization were 
discussed at the conference.   
In 2004, 2005 and 2006 IME together with ERB 
members – brain trusts sharing a philosophy 
close to ours, often under the auspices of the 
Institute for Research of Economy and Fisc 
(IREF, www.irefeurope.org) – has been one of 
the leading advocates of taxation competition in 
Europe and around the world. 
At the meeting in Borovetz in 2004 a statement 
was made at the gala dinner by the Minister of 
Finance Milen Velchev: “It is a challenge for 
me to be the first minister of finance to endorse 
the recent appeal of Professor Victoria Curzon-
Price, president of Mont Pelerin Society, for 
abolition of the corporate profit tax in the whole 
world. Of course, Bulgaria can afford that in 
coordination with the EU. This is a way of 
achieving a harmonization of corporate 
marginal rates in community at a minimum 
level”. 
At a round table, organized by the Union of 
Democratic Forces, on October 28, 2004, Georgi 
Angelov presented the possibilities for reduction 
of the social contributions burden from 42.7%, 
as it was then, to 10%. 
At the beginning of November 2004, by 
tradition, IME prepared and presented An 
Alternative Budget for 2005. The budget 
envisioned income accounting to 34.5% of the 
gross domestic product, expenses accounting to 
32.8% of the gross domestic product and a 
surplus of 1.7%. The basic reforms it contained 
were: 
- Reduction of direct taxes to 10% - profit tax, 
income tax, contributions payments. 
- Reduction of state expenses through cutting 
down of the administration and budget 
employees, optimization of the spending on 
state administrations, reduction of the subsidies 
for activities incurring losses, reduction of 
ineffective interference with the labor market, 
transfer of expenses to the private sector and 
faster privatization. 
- Using of the budget surpluses for carrying out 
a pension reform, capitalization of social 
security contributions and other structural 
reforms, as well as for covering any eventual 
unexpected changes in the economic 
environment. 
 
Realized change: Reduction of profit tax from 
19.5% to 15% from 2005. 
Realized change: Reduction of dividend tax 
from 15% to 7% from 2005. 
Realized change: Reduction of the highest 
marginal rate of income tax from 29% to 
24% in 2005. 
 
2005 
On November 4, 2005, IME together with 10 
other non-governmental organizations and 
centers for analyses, published An Open Letter 
for Reduction of Taxes, which once again 
received a wide media coverage and support. 
The number of people and organizations who 
signed it was constantly growing and we all 
should express our gratitude to them. Here are 
the basic theses of this letter: 
“In recent years the consolidated state 
budget shows a significant over-
fulfillment of incomes and a surplus. 
Between 2001 and 2004 the total over-
fulfillment of budget incomes accounts to 
2.7 billion levs. In 2005 we expect an 
over-fulfillment of 1.5-2 billion levs. In 
addition to that, on account of the 
requirements of the European Union, 
Bulgaria will significantly increase its 
excise duties and the incomes from them. 
On the other hand, the big share of grey 
economy in the country is a significant 
reserve for budget incomes by creating 
the corresponding tax stimuli for its 
abolishment. Last but not least, more 
active measures from the government 
towards the carrying out of a reform in 
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the budget sphere could increase the 
effectiveness and optimize the expenses. 
For these reasons we believe that a 
significant reduction of tax and social 
security contributions burden on 
Bulgarian citizens and the companies 
operating on the territory of Bulgaria, is 
possible through a policy of reduction of 
marginal rates, simplification of the 
taxation system and reduction of 
excessive procedures and expenses for its 
functioning.” 
During the elections in 2005 IME put the debate 
over the taxes in the pre-election competition. 
Three of our colleagues at IME (Georgi 
Angelov, Martin Dimitrov and Dimitar 
Chobanov) were candidates for deputies and 
proved to be the undoubted leaders in the pre-
election campaign with their presence in the 
press, the electronic media, radio and television. 
They changed the rhetoric and the way of 
leading pre-election disputes. 
Here is what one of the authors of the present 
article noted at that time: Thanks to IME there is 
one common denominator in all pre-election 
programs – the ideas for reduction of taxes, the 
attention towards reforms in the other quasi-
state funds – pension contributions, healthcare 
and education, and last but not least  - the 
reduction of the quasi-taxes, i.e. the so called 
administrative and regulatory regimes. 
A result of the clear argumentation, the pro-
market ideas for reforms, as well as the efforts 
for increasing people’s welfare was the 
invitation from The United Democratic Forces to 
three economists from IME to participate in the 
pre-election campaign and in the parliamentary 
elections. One of them, Martin Dimitrov, is 
already in the parliament as deputy chairperson 
of the Budget and Finance Committee and is an 
observer in EP. To Mr. Dimitrov the Bulgarian 
society owes a significant part of the 
improvements of the tax environment during this 
year. 
In November, for a third successive year the 
Institute for Market Economics prepared An 
Alternative Budget for 2006, whose aim was to 
show that the reduction of the taxes was possible 
in a relatively short time. IME’s budget for 2006 
envisioned incomes at 35.2% of the gross 
domestic product, expenses – 34.8% of GDP and 
respectively a surplus of 0.4% of GDP.  
This budget is based on the following reforms:  
•  Reduction of direct taxes to 10% - profit tax, 
income tax, social security contributions 
payments;  
•  Abolition of dividend tax;  
•  8% social security contributions for 
individuals born after 1959 in a private pension 
fund;  
•  Reduction of state expenses through decrease 
in the administration, decrease in the expenses 
for the costs of the state administrations, 
reduction by half of the subsidies for activities 
incurring losses;  
•  Abolition of programs for interference with 
the labor market, faster privatization and transfer 
of capital expenses towards the private sector, 
smaller reserve for structural reform;  
•  Using the budget surplus for a pension reform.  
As a result of the reduction of the total level of 
taxes in the alternative budget the disposable 
income and the economic activity would 
increase, more stimuli for entrepreneurship and 
labor, for investments, savings and accumulation 
of capital would be created, the economic 
growth and the welfare of people would 
increase.  
 
Realized change: Reduction of contributions 
with 6% from 2006. 
Realized change: Abolition of the lowest 
marginal rate of income tax from 2006. 
 
 
2006 
The debate over the reduction of the tax burden 
was continued by IME in 2006 as well. In three 
issues of the Bulletin for low taxes, multiple 
publications in IME’s Economic Policy Review, 
many articles in the press and participations in 
the media, IME kept active the debate over the 
necessity of reduction of the tax burden. Again, 
IME’s prognosis that in 2006 again there will be 
a large budget surplus proved to be much more 
correct, than the prognosis of the government for 
a zero budget surplus for the year. 
 
Realized change: Reduction of profit tax from 
15% to 10% in 2007. 
Projected change: reduction of social security 
contributions in 2007. 
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Mechanisms used by IME: 
1. Preparing of an Alternative budget – 
three successive years 
2. Articles in the weekly bulletin of IME 
Economic Policy Review – more than 
500 articles on this topic 
3. Articles in newspapers and magazines 
4. Participation in the media – scores of 
participations of IME economists in 
radio and TV programs. 
5. Issuing a monthly Bulletin for law taxes 
“Flat tax”– more than 100 articles 
focused on this topic 
6. A special website dedicated to 
Economic Freedom 
7. Annual presentation of the indexes of 
economic freedom of  the Heritage 
Foundation and the Fraser Institute 
8. Participation in Bulgarian and 
international conferences on the topic – 
hundreds in Bulgaria and dozens abroad 
9. Translation and popularization of  
international researches and articles on 
the topic of taxation 
 
Past and Present 
The review of tax policy in Bulgaria, Poland and 
Slovakia in 1997 and 1998 showed the 
following: 
1. At that time the business in Bulgaria did 
not accept the idea of flat and low tax, the 
general inclination was towards enjoying 
privileges on the back of the taxpayers. 
2. This necessitated a relatively detailed 
research of grey economy and the stimuli 
for operating in its fames, which we did in 
the year 2000 together with Harvard 
University and the Agency for Economic 
Analyses and Prognosis, and in 2003 on our 
own, but in the context of a comparison 
between Bulgaria, Romania and Serbia. 
3. It proved necessary to also examine the 
procedures for following the tax and other 
laws. A leading role in these researches had 
Lachezar Bogdanov and Jordanka 
Gancheva, as well as the authors and all our 
colleagues at IME. 
4. In Poland a Finance Minister and very 
popular reformer resigned because of the 
refusal of the political parties to accept his 
tax reforms. 
5. In Slovakia the business had the same 
attitude towards the flat tax as in Bulgaria 
and Mr. Mechiar’s government started 
nearly persecuting the people we 
collaborated with. One of them – Jan 
Oravetz – found out how to solve the 
problem: he established a foundation of the 
taxpayers, who in 2004 imposed on the 
politicians the introduction of a flat tax. 
6. At that time in Bulgaria emerged three 
organizations of the tax-payers, all of them 
established by former employees and past 
and present advisors at the ministry of 
finance. This made the normal functioning 
of such organizations in Bulgaria 
impossible.  
The context of these efforts is also changing. 
Their success depends more and more on the 
determination of Bulgaria and the citizens to 
stand their ground before the EU. At a session of 
ECOFIN on September 25th this year, under the 
banner of „optimal taxation” Brussels 
bureaucracy initiated action towards seeking 
„tax harmonization” between the member-states, 
a harmonization aimed at the high taxation 
levels in the EU. 
For now it is not clear whether this is the exact 
intention of the actions, but if they are successful 
– which is after all hardly probable, the result 
will be keeping the lower levels of welfare in 
New Europe for a longer period of time. 
At the end, we would like to thank once again 
everyone who openly expressed their support to 
the idea of reduction of the tax burden in 
Bulgaria. During all this time IME received 
support from citizens, companies, associations, 
non-governmental organizations and 
international partners in its efforts. In the future 
the Institute will continue encouraging the 
reduction of the tax burden, which remains too 
high in Bulgaria, especially regarding the 
taxation of labor. In a month IME will publish 
its regular alternative low taxes budget for 2007. 
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Political Constellations around Tax 
“Innovations” in New Europe3 
Krassen Stanchev 
 
Background 
In 1996-1997, I had the pleasure to coordinate a 
think tank effort to instantiate reforms in 
Bulgaria, Poland and Slovakia that would lead to 
the adoption of flat tax4. Part of the effort  
included asking businesses to approve or 
disapprove low and flat tax. In all three countries 
disapproval rates were higher than approval 
ones. In Bulgaria, the ratio was, roughly, 35:65.  
I cannot comment on the reasons for this 
constellation in other countries but in Bulgaria 
two sets of believes contributed to this attitude: 
the idea that a given business, say SME, should 
be treated more generously by the government; 
and the idea that certain businesses should be 
compensated for losses incurred due to 
government policies in the first half of the 
1990’s. 
There were two key conclusions from that effort: 
1. Businesses were not likely to be the 
prime reform demanders, therefore, there 
was a need to recruit broad public support; 
2. Broader reform issued needed to be 
addressed for having reforms (aimed at tax 
lowering and flatter taxes) accomplished, 
e.g. expenditure reforms and lowering, 
decomposition of the welfare state, etc. 
The fate of that reform in those three 
countries was, roughly the following: 
• In Slovakia, Jan Oravec of the Hayek 
Foundation established a tax payers’ 
association and through it managed to push 
forward an introduction of 19-% flat tax. 
• In Poland, the idea for tax reform was 
dropped altogether, at least until 2001, in 
2001 one finance minister, Leszek 
Balcerowicz, resigned for not being able to 
persuade fellow cabinet members to 
implement his tax reform ideas; Poland 
focused on quazi-taxes instead 
                                                 
3 First presented at the 30th Summer University on 
New Economics in Aix-en-Provence, August 29, 
2006. 
4 See, collection of reports at: www.ime.bg 
(discussion). 
(implemented Economic Activities Act – in 
2001, and Economic Freedom Act – enacted 
on May 1 2004). 
• In Bulgaria, there was no political party 
or a politician to like the tax reform 
objectives; there were three tax-payers’ 
unions, all established by employees and 
advisors to the treasury; so, the feasible 
strategy was to start a broad public 
education and focus reformists’ efforts on 
welfare state, expenditures and detailed (but 
yet understandable) argumentation of the 
need for reform. 
 
Political constellations of the eve of lowering 
taxes 
The Baltic countries seemed to have benefited 
form the fact that their respective treasuries did 
not have sufficient resources for any sort of 
substantial redistributionist policy mix. In 
different years they pegged their currencies to 
Deutsche Mark or to a basket of DM and US 
Dollar, a policy that motivated a flexibility, 
liberalization of fiscal policies combined with 
strictly observed budget constraints and deepest 
than in Europe trade liberalization, as it was 
implemented in Estonia. And it was Estonia, 
again, to prompt in early 1990’s with a flat tax 
system (at around 25% threshold on individual 
and corporate income). The Estonian system is 
now being further reformed towards lower tax 
rates (aimed at 20% for personal income in 
2007). Lithuania and Latvia did something 
similar (in 1994 and 1995) but with greater 
differentiations between personal and corporate 
taxes. 
Flat taxes since then were implemented in 
numerous countries: Georgia, Romania, Russia, 
Serbia (and Montenegro), Slovakia and Ukraine. 
Macedonia is the next in line. In some countries, 
like Bulgaria, the policy is still one of multiple 
thresholds, but the difference between is 1-2% 
and, thus, it is almost flat. 
A closer look at the constellations at the eve of 
introduction of plat taxes, allow drawing a sort 
of a common denominator: 
Most countries introduced flat taxes with the 
view on increasing the budget revenues, and 
rarely, if not never, there was a consecutive 
policy to reduce or restructure expenditures. 
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Peculiarities of lower tax reforms of the (EU) 
New Member States 
Interestingly enough, the new member states 
behaved in this respect as most of the non-
member states, similar to those of former Soviet 
Union (FSU). Here are some comparisons: 
• Often flat income tax is combined with 
lower rates of corporate taxation, and this is 
a common feature of Baltic with other EU 
countries, including those supposed to join 
EU; 
• This constellation is different from that 
of FSU, where corporate taxation is higher 
than the flat rate (which is, in turn, lower 
than respective taxes in the Baltics, Slovakia 
and Romania); this is to be explained by 
government ownership on natural resource 
companies and late or delayed privatization; 
• It is obvious, that apart from servicing to 
objective to increase revenues, the flat tax 
reform aimed at creating incentives to invest 
(FDI in particular). 
• No country have ever effectively 
reformed the welfare state, which is evident 
from the rates of the social taxes; the so-
called social contributions rates are 1.5-2 
time higher than the personal income tax; 
• On average government expenditures in 
the new member states remain in the last 
seven years considerably lower than the 
average share of government expenditures 
in the respective GDPs of the old members 
states; there are exceptions (e.g. Bulgaria’s 
government expenditures in the last five 
years stay at around 41% of GDP) but the 
overall level of the new member states and 
Romania is 36-37% of GDP. 
 
The impact of regulations and EU accession 
The compliance cost of EU companies and 
individuals (i.e. the costs of operating within the 
laws and to deal with governments) were last 
studied by OECD for the entire Union in 2001. 
For the new members states there are different 
estimates, and only rarely there profound 
surveys on these cots in the accession countries.  
The picture is roughly the following: the EU 
compliance costs are EURO 540 billion in 2000, 
3-4% of GDP for that year. In the new member 
states, these costs are believe to be up to two 
times higher, because of juridical harmonization, 
the pace of the process and due to inherited 
administrative inefficiency. These impacts were 
combining with much better visible impacts of 
the higher EU indirect taxes (most often duties 
on tobacco, gasoline and gas). 
This was one of the factors to convince political 
establishments of the new countries to use the 
only available fiscal policy instrument to 
mitigate the costs, and they reduced the direct 
tax burdens. Politicians in countries that did not 
lower taxes, like Poland, dealt with indirect 
taxes, but the impacts are not yet studied.  
 
Globalization and taxes 
There is yet little empirical research but it is 
possible to assume that the EU governments are 
doomed to collect less taxes. Factors that 
contribute to this are the following: 
• The existence of jurisdictions that 
maintain low taxes, low transaction 
costs and better rule of low; 
• Electronic money; 
• The use of Internet in channeling 
investment and savings and in retailing; 
• The overall greater mobility of factors of 
production, particularly capital and 
people. 
 
Conclusions 
It is unlikely that new member states would 
reverse the policies of lowering direct taxes. 
However, the unreformed or rather semi-
reformed social welfare systems (pay-as-you-go 
pensions, centralized healthcare) would probably 
work as a factor that requires constant if not 
upstream inflow of revenue. 
With privatization, in the some of FSU countries 
there might be a shift in the policies, e.g. 
lowering of corporate tax rates in order to boost 
investment; it is likely that the former Yugoslav 
countries are moving in this direction, e.g. it is 
almost certain that Macedonia will have a 10-
percent flat tax on personal and corporate 
income two to three years from now. Lower 
levels of indirect taxes in countries neighboring 
the EU would also pressure their EU neighbors 
to lower taxes or at least keep the existing levels.  
It is difficult to predict the pace but it is obvious 
that the tax competition is already out there. 
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* One exception is Bulgaria, in 2000 and 2001. 
 
 
 
Bulgaria – An EU member from 1st January 
2007 
Adriana Mladenova 
 
On 26th of September 2006 the final Monitoring 
Report of the European Commission on Bulgaria 
was released with the statement that Bulgaria 
will become a full-pledged member of the union 
on 1st of January 2007. For now there are no 
protective clauses, but the European 
Commission has left an open way by declaring 
explicitly that the strict supervision and control 
on the areas of concern in the country will 
continue. Protective clauses in the sphere of 
internal affairs and judiciary system can be 
activated later on, and part of the subsidies and 
money from the Eurofunds can be reduced or 
declined ex-post, if supervision shows that 
Bulgaria does not meet the requirements of EU 
concerning the transparency of the expenditure 
of public resources, fighting corruption, 
efficiency and independence of the judicial 
system.  
Bulgaria’s accession to EU legitimates the 
economic reforms that have been undertaken (or 
have begun) in the name of the country’s 
integration to the Eurozone. The EU 
membership has psychological, political and 
economic dimensions, which should be 
considered together (in order) to draw a 
complete picture of the accession process. By 
any means, the recent events and the tension on 
the political scene in Hungary and Poland, 
which coincided with the period of the official 
release of the decision for the next EU 
enlargement in 2007, also have impact on the 
attitudes of people for the functioning of the 
“common European family”. Politicians and 
lawmakers in each state bear responsibility 
before their voters, and the EU membership 
cannot be used as an excuse for the lack of 
coordination of their economic programs with 
the citizens. 
The economic consequences for Bulgaria of the 
accession to the EU are not one-sided and 
straightforward. The Institute of Market 
Economics as an independent non-governmental 
organization, promoting market solutions in the 
conducted economic policy, have stressed 
continuously on the problems the problems, 
related to the European Union including heavy 
bureaucratic machine, strict regulations for 
certain business activities, (which distorts the 
market reality), numerous norms and rules, 
(which operate in different institutional 
environments and informal sets of behavior 
practices), etc. The IME is simultaneously 
welcoming the liberal ideas of the EU 
concerning free movement of Capital, goods and 
services, people, and continuing the open debate 
on the problematic spheres, where there is 
disparity between reality and the principles of 
economic freedom.  
The EU does not mean automatic increase in the 
incomes of citizens, but it does assist for 
improvement of the functioning of many of the 
institutions – judicial system, protection of 
property rights, and control on the spending of 
the public resources. The establishment of an 
effective institutional frame is a necessary 
prerequisite for the economic development and 
flourishing of entrepreneurship. At the same 
time, discussions about the policies of the EU in 
a number of spheres should be further intensified 
– such as redistribution of resourses through the 
government sector, imposition of regulations on 
the labor market, protectionism in the sector of 
agriculture, tax duties harmonization. We should 
not forget that the EU is before all a political 
unit, which means that the interests of the 
politically active and ‘strong’ often dominate 
when decisions concerning all members of the 
Community are taken. 
The focus of (the) attention should not be 
directed only to the grants and subsidies, which 
we will receive as an EU member. The agenda 
of the commentaries on the report by EC are 
centered only on the possibility of reducing the 
amount of the structural funds or the direct 
payments for agricultural producers. However, 
this may happen only if the administration does 
not do its job. Additionally, even if all 
requirements and conditions of the European 
Commission are met, the application process for 
the structural and cohesion funds will start at the 
end of 2007, according to the official timetable. 
The absorption of resources during the first 
years of the operation of the financial 
mechanisms of EU is traditionally weak for the 
new EU-members (15-30%), so the possibility 
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of reduction of the promised money should not 
be dramatized. The granted money by itself is 
not a guarantee for improving the living standard 
of people, the significant point is how the funds 
have been allocated and exhausted. (the 
important thing is where it will be distributed to 
and how it will be spent.) And for this purpose, 
visible and well-established business models and 
entrepreneur ideas should be available on the 
market. There is not invented by now any central 
planning mechanism by which scarce resources 
in the economy to be effectively and fairly 
allocated. The market makes it most efficiently 
(“the invisible hand of the market”), and as a 
result, the interests of both consumers and 
suppliers coincide.  
The positive effects from the EU accession for 
Bulgaria are the following: 
? More trade within the EU, which will 
have by all means, a positive impact on 
the economy – due to specialization and 
competition pressure; 
? Easier traveling and more opportunities 
for professional realization of people, 
gaining experience and appearance of 
new business opportunities on the 
horizon; 
? More chances for people to get 
education and qualification abroad; 
? Exchanging of ideas, know-how and 
best practices by attracting investors and 
foreign companies outsourcing their 
operations in Bulgaria; and 
? Harmonization of procedures and rules, 
which facilitates doing business, 
establishment of well-defined property 
rights and greater accountability of 
institutional and economic environment. 
At the same time, the EU membership does not 
excuse Bulgaria of the necessity for launching 
and conducting more economic reforms; on the 
contrary, this need gets even stronger. It is so 
because being an EU member means that 
Bulgaria will have to compete “on an equal 
basis” with: 
? The tax systems of the new EU 
members, which attract more and more 
investors form “old Europe” due to their 
low tax rates and lessening of the tax 
burden for the business; 
? High labor productivity in Austria and 
Germany; 
? Technological progress in Ireland and 
Finland; 
? Level of education and qualification in 
Great Britain and Netherlands; 
? Efficiency of the public sector and 
transparent rules of managing of the 
public resources in Denmark and 
Sweden.  
The conclusion is that the Bulgaria’s EU 
membership should not be regarded from an 
economic point of view either as too pessimistic 
or too optimistic. The future economic growth of 
the economy and improvement in the well being 
of people depend on the political will for 
continuing of the economic reforms and 
applying the best, market-driven practices from 
the EU. 
  
 
An Overview of the Policies in the Tobacco 
Production Sector 
Metodi V.Metodiev 
 
In the political space this week there has been 
talk about the real prospect for subsidizing 
Bulgarian tobacco producers with money from 
the state budget for three more years. This 
proposal is based on the permission given by the 
European Commission at the end of August. 
We set as our task to make a general overview of 
the policies of the European Union and the 
Bulgarian state regarding tobacco production. 
What is the situation in the tobacco 
production sector? 
Tobacco production is under the protection of 
the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the 
EU. In its frames the ensuring of the production 
and its following realization are guaranteed on 
the basis of the so called instruments of the 
CAP: 
1) Direct (compensation) payments – funds are 
granted directly to farmers by a scheme for 
income support. They compensate the gradual 
reduction of the prices of agricultural production 
and are, as European practice indicates, a 
substantial additional income for agricultural 
producers. 
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2) Intervention – i.e. buying up of agricultural 
products by a special Intervention agency of the 
country, for a certain period (a period of 
intervention), at fixed (intervention) price. Thus, 
the realization of the production at an acceptable 
price is guaranteed. Intervention is a means of 
market interference – agricultural production is 
bought up in case there is a very high supply at 
low prices. This process is to be administered by 
the State Fund “Agriculture”, which will be 
accredited as an intervention agency. For some 
sectors like fruit and vegetables, interventions 
will be carried out by acknowledged producer 
organizations.  
3) International trade regime – this is the special 
EU regime for the import and export, whose 
main aim is protection of agricultural production 
and of the market for agricultural production in 
the European Union. Export subsidies belong to 
this type of aid. 
The Common Agricultural Policy introduces a 
single payment per farm or per hectare, with 
which direct payments are decoupled from 
production. In the case of tobacco, the reform 
will become effective from harvest 2006, as for 
the period from 2006 to 2009 inclusive, a  
compulsory decoupling of direct payments and 
production is envisioned, ranging from 40 to 
60% (at the choice of the member state). From 
2010 on, after the three years have elapsed, the 
Single Payment Scheme (SPS) will be applied, 
i.e. a single payment per farm will be applied.   
Besides the instruments of the CAP, the tobacco 
production sector also enjoys the protection of 
the state. The mechanism through which it 
provides the welfare of tobacco producers is 
entitled “Common Organization of the market 
for raw tobacco”.  
Its main aspects of activity are:  
1) A system for determining production quotas – 
the Council of Ministers determines a maximum 
guaranteed limit for production of raw tobacco 
in the EU, within which individual maximum 
guaranteed limits are determined for each group 
of tobacco for three consecutive harvests. On the 
basis of these limits the Council allocates 
through production quotas the quantity for each 
group of tobacco, which is consigned for 
production to each country – producer of 
tobacco. The member state, on the basis of the 
quantity assigned to it, determines and allocates 
individual production quotas to the respective 
national producers or producer organizations. 
2) A premium system – the amount of the 
premium is determined for each harvest by the 
Council and is different for the separate brand 
groups raw tobacco, but is the same for the 
brands in a certain group. Only tobacco 
produced within the limits of the respective 
quota is awarded a premium. The premium is 
divided into three parts: a) fixed – it is paid only 
to producers or their organizations, b) variable – 
comprises 30% to 45% of the total amount of the 
premium and is paid to the producer 
organizations, and they distribute it among its 
members according to the quality of their 
individual production and the price paid by the 
primary processor, c) specific – amounts to 2% 
and is granted to organizations for definite 
purposes like improvement of the management 
and the organization, activities related to 
environmental protection and others. 
3) Producer groups - a) their members should be 
only producers of raw tobacco, b) the group 
should not carry out primary processing of raw 
tobacco, c) each producer should be a member 
of only one group of tobacco producers, d) they 
should have information about the production 
which has been produced and realized, 
information about areas, brand structure, 
quantities, quality classes and sales, e) pay their 
members the price of the production which has 
been sold, f) have a common quota for raw 
tobacco, which the members of the organization 
produce, no less than 1% of the total amount for 
the country per year and 0.3% for 16 specially 
appointed municipalities in the country, etc. 
4) Tobacco-growing contracts – in the tobacco-
growing contracts there are some explicitly 
specified requirements like: a) contracting 
parties b) minimum quality requirements for 
each class, with minimum 3 classes and an 
obligation from the producer to supply tobacco, 
which meets at least these minimum 
requirements c) an obligation from the primary 
processors to pay the purchase price according 
to the quality, etc. 
5) Approving of processors, who can conclude 
contacts – the member states, on whose territory 
the primary processors are found, are obliged to 
approve the processors, who can conclude 
contracts for tobacco growing, as in the case of 
breaking some of the requirements, the permit of 
the processor could be taken away by the 
member state.  
 
The necessary conclusions 
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Led rather by narrow party interests, than by 
rational economic reasons, statesmen increase 
the interference with a sector, which has been 
(for reasons unknown) declared a priority. Thus 
the state encourages keeping the status quo – 
protectionism of a highest level, logically linked 
to ineffectiveness and lack non-competitive 
production. For sustaining the vital functions of 
the tobacco sector enormous amounts of funds 
are being poured, taken of course from the 
taxpayers. 
It is obvious that this does not stimulate the 
sector’s development; on the contrary – it is put 
in isolation from the real market situation. And 
this hinders market competition. The state 
interferes in the economy by allocating 
resources to a sector with a low added value for 
economy, and last but not least, thus distorts 
market logic and stimuli. 
 
What should be done? A few recommendations: 
1) The right of ownership should be 
guaranteed through a stable, effective 
and transparent judiciary system. 
2) Privatization of “Bulgartabac” 
3) Withdrawal of the state from its 
inappropriate regulatory functions in the 
sector – i.e. minimizing the state’s 
interference with the tobacco market, 
abolishing of the barriers to export and 
import, abolishing of all protectionist 
tariffs, abolishing of the production 
quotas. 
4) Abolishing of subsidies, because they 
create a culture of dependence and are 
an obstacle to the effective management 
of farms and hinder the natural process 
of land consolidation. 
5) Dedicating vigor and energy to quickly 
completing the establishment of an 
Integrated Administration and Control 
System (IACS), Paying agency and 
Land Parcel Identification System 
(LPIS). 
 
As a conclusion we can say that the proper 
enactment of these recommendations would 
encourage the effectiveness, entrepreneurship, 
sense of innovation and competition in the 
sector, which, combined with the free market 
determinants of demand and supply, will decide 
its future.  
 
 
The “Bulgartabac”’s Saga – the Beginning of 
the End, or Is It? 
Veliko Dimitrov 
 
Better 17 years late than never. 
“Bulgartabac” was established in 1951 as part of 
the universal nationalization of 1947, and the 
introduction of state monopoly over the tobacco 
industry by the Communist Party. The status of 
Bulgartabac was changed only with the 
formation of a holding with 22 subsidiary 
companies in 19935. (It stayed so until the 
changes or more exactly until 1993, when a 
holding was formed with 22 subsidiary 
companies, 70 % of which are still state-owned 
at present. In 1995 the subsidiaries were 
included in the mass privatization.)  
The primary attempts for full privatization of the 
tobacco monopolist were made in 2002 when the 
National Assembly accepted a privatization 
                                                 
5 70% of these subsidiaries are still state-owned at the 
present moment – October, 2006 
strategy, envisioning a package sale of the 
holding. With a huge delay, the primary attempts 
for full privatization of the tobacco monopolist 
were made in 2002 – The National Assembly 
accepted a privatization strategy, envisioning a 
package sale of the holding. Next year (2003) a 
public competition for the sale was announced,. 
(but no agreement was reached). 
The next mediocre attempt for full privatization 
was made in 2004, when again a public 
competition for sale was announced. The result 
was unconvincing with only three sales achieved 
out of twelve offered for tobacco processing 
companies, and absolutely none for the four 
cigarette factories. 
At first glance the two unsuccessful attempts 
suggest that there isn’t enough investment 
interest towards the tobacco sector in Bulgaria, 
and the subsidiary companies in the holding 
cannot be sold. However, a more profound look 
at the unsuccessful privatization shows that it is 
due rather to unwillingness of certain political 
clique to finish the privatization than to lack of 
investor’s interest. This statement might be 
supported by the fact that each time when the 
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privatization of Bulgartabac is undertaken 
“someone” draws the attention from the 
privatization deal as a whole to particular 
insignificant milieu within it (i.e. price not high 
enough, conditions not satisfying enough, etc.). 
The consequences (however) are not positive. 
The long standing state guardianship created an 
industry which, as it turned out to be in the last 
weeks, functions quite ineffectively compared to 
its future European competitors. The companies 
did not go bankrupt because, first of all they 
were state-owned, and second, the government, 
through its direct interference in setting the 
prices6 guaranteed their sustainability during the 
whole period. With the following small 
exception: in the beginning of 2005 the cigarette 
market was liberalized  – the prices of tobacco 
products could then be freely determined, by 
producers as well as by importers7. (as it was 
only necessary to inform the Ministry of 
Finance). Thus, a big step forward was made 
and the conditions for the normal development 
of the sector were created. The registration 
regime did not last long though– in less than 
three months from the decision for liberalization 
of the market, representatives of Bulgartabac 
petitioned to the Ministry of Finance for the 
prices of cigarettes to be again determined on 
administrative grounds. (Through), It was tacitly 
admitted that the holding is not competitive 
when prices are freely determined, which, as it 
can be expected, do not always under all 
circumstances guarantee fixed and pre-planned 
profit. The result was that the price fixing 
practices were (control over the prices) restored. 
Ineffective production is however only part of 
the bigger problems of cross subsidizing of 
activities within the holding. 
Ineffective production is however only a part of 
the problem, an effect stemming from what is 
may be the basic obstacle to better development 
of the holding – the cross-subsidizing of 
activities within it. The two relatively most 
profitable factories are those for cigarette 
production in Sofia and Blagoevgrad. Their 
profits, instead of being reinvested in 
improvement of the technical and technological 
parameters, advertising and achieving a more 
sustainable production, are poured into the 
tobacco-processing factories which incur losses 
                                                 
6 it determines the prices, including those of the 
importers 
7 The only requirement for the importer was to inform 
the Ministry of Finance for the decided price.  
and which continue to buy and overstock 
tobacco. As it is clear, there are no economic, 
but only political grounds for this. 
And all that lasted for years. However, reality 
has been changed. 
Excise rates on tobacco products were sharply 
increased at the beginning of the year, which, 
according to representatives of the holding will 
reduce the annual profit with about 50-60%. A 
new increase is expected from next year. Our 
forthcoming membership in the EU necessitated 
a repeated liberalization of prices, which became 
a fact several days ago8 and can be expected to 
be final. In other words, there can be price 
competition as well. 
Taking into account these changes in the 
situation, the holding was quick to react: it 
became clear that one employee in the Bulgarian 
cigarette factories produces a much lower 
amount than in the analogical factories in 
Western Europe and not with a lower wage. In 
the words of the managing director of the 
holding Mr. Hristo Lachev the average salary in 
“Blagoevgrad BT” AD for example is 1 500 
levs. At first glance this might seem lower than 
its equivalent in the EU, but if the difference in 
the purchasing power parity is taken into 
account, which is roughly 1:3, it is probably 
even higher. If the effectiveness is also taken 
into account, than for a final production unit in 
Bulgaria the employee is paid manifold more 
than in Western Europe. In other words, the 
reform and the complete privatization of the 
holding cannot be delayed. 
 
What is about to happen with the tobacco 
holding? 
At the beginning of the year, at meetings of 
Supervisory and Management Board a decision 
was made for restructuring of the holding and 
selling the stakes in the following companies: 
“Plovdiv Yurii Gagarin BT” AD (already a 
fact); (sold) 
“Asenovgrad BT” AD – by a public offering of 
shares on the Bulgarian Stock Market - Sofia; 
“Shumen BT” AD – by a public offering of 
shares; 
                                                 
8 On October 13, 2006 the order, which enacts it, will 
become effective. 
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“Pazardzhik BT” AD – by a public offering of 
shares; 
“Dupnitza BT” AD – by a publicly announced 
competition; 
“Sandanski BT” AD – by a publicly announced 
competition; 
“Yambol BT” AD – by a publicly announced 
competition; 
“Smolyan BT” AD – by a publicly announced 
competition; 
 
No privatization is envisioned or there is no 
clarity regarding the following companies from 
the holding: 
“Blagoevgrad BT” AD (not to be privatized); 
“Sofia BT” AD (not to be privatized); 
“Plovdiv BT” AD (not to be privatized); 
“Slantze Stara Zagora BT” AD (not to be 
privatized); 
“Pleven BT” AD (not to be privatized); 
 “Dulovo BT” AD (there is a process going on 
and the outcome is not clear); 
“Gotze Delchev BT” AD (not decided); 
“Kardzhali BT” AD (not decided); 
“Haskovo BT” AD (in liquidation); 
“Vidin BT” AD (in liquidation); 
“Harmanli BT” AD (not clear); 
“Topolovgrad BT” AD (not clear); 
“Purvomai BT” AD (not clear); 
“Isperih BT” AD (not clear). 
  
In quintessence, the changes are partial and no 
privatization is envisioned for the major tobacco 
companies (the tobacco plants). The 
restructuring of the subsidiaries is justified only 
for the purpose of their future selling, but for 
many of them it is not at stake at the near future 
(on the agenda). There is a great probability for 
the financial indicators of the holding to worsen 
sharply and in about a year they might be at 
much lower price than at present. Thus, since 
full privatization will be fulfilled anyway, any 
postponement will be a mistake. In this sense 
any postponing of the full privatization is a 
mistake, which will however probably be a fact.  
 
 
The Development Pact – Few Good Ideas and 
Many Wishes 
Dimitar Chobanov 
 
On 26th of September of the current year, the 
government together with the two largest trade 
unions and employer organizations signed the 
Economic and Social Development Pact, which 
regulates the development in Bulgaria up till 
2009. It contains the directions for conducting 
the economic policy until the end of the current 
government’s mandate considering the interests 
of both workers and employers. However, the 
character of the document predetermines the 
lack of particular suggestions for measures in 
many of the spheres it refers to, which makes it 
all too similar to a pre-election program. Again, 
there are too many promises and it is not clear 
whether they will be kept. 
In the document there are some terms, which are 
rather controversial. The realization of the basic 
principles of the European social model, (for 
example) is presented as a major challenge. 
Discussing such a model is incorrect, 
considering the great differences within the 
European Union, where the systems in Ireland 
and England are significantly different from 
those in Sweden and Denmark. Following the 
example of Ireland, which relies to a great extent 
on individual responsibility and economic 
freedom and achieves much better results 
concerning the increase of incomes, employment 
and welfare, or (following) the example of 
Germany, where economic growth during the 
last few years is considerably lower, and 
unemployment is higher, are two types of policy, 
which could not be put together under the name 
European social model. For this reason such 
texts should be clarified before adopting the 
final version. 
The priorities set out are catch-up development, 
accelerated judicial reform, high quality and 
accessible education and healthcare, 
continuation of privatization, etc. They are by 
themselves good and should be realized. But for 
this purpose some criteria which allow 
comparison and measurement of the eventual 
progress are necessary. The only quantitative 
measurement instrument mentioned among the 
priorities is economic growth, which should be 
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about 6% per year. Probably this number 
corresponds to the Bulgarian socialist party’s 
pre-election program and reflects the current 
rate. According to the last available data of the 
National Statistic Institute, the real growth of the 
gross domestic product for the 6 months 
compared to the corresponding period last year 
is 6.1% and probably for the whole year 2006 a 
value close to this will be achieved. Therefore 
the policy of the government will rather be 
oriented towards keeping this pace, than towards 
its acceleration. 
The engagements for achieving the goals are the 
essential part of the text. A substantial emphasis 
is put on increasing the effectiveness of state 
administration, and also the possibility for 
transferring activities towards the private sector 
has been mentioned. Some measures included 
here are reducing and facilitating the regulatory 
regimes, e-government, tacit consent, public-
private partnerships. They would have a positive 
impact on the work of the administration and 
would improve business environment. Only 
these ideas aren’t new at all - they have been 
discussed for quite a long time, but their 
application has either been postponed or has 
been incomplete. Mentioning them in such a 
pact does not change the situation – i.e. it is 
clear what has to be done, but it is not clear 
whether there will be enough will and capacity 
for carrying it out. 
On the other hand, the transferring of the 
administration of some of the regulatory regimes 
towards branch organizations can be used for 
setting greater barriers to entering the market by 
new subjects and for reducing the competition. 
For this reason, first of all these regimes have to 
be limited to the maximum possible extent, and 
only then should such actions be taken. 
In the Pact there are many texts, which envision 
an increase of the state expenses, such as the 
suggestions for higher expenses for healthcare 
and education, for better technical servicing of 
the administration, for higher wages of budget 
employees. All these measures have to be more 
closely bound to optimization and cutting of 
other expenses and to more concrete reforms. 
In the sphere of healthcare, no significant change 
is envisioned about the monopolistic position of 
the National Health Insurance Fund, although 
some mechanisms for better control over its 
expenditures are suggested. In the sphere of 
education a more specific text about the 
implementation of the voucher system also is 
missing. 
Suggestions concerning taxes and the fisc are 
also not stated clearly enough, and the only 
marginal rate which is mentioned is 18% of the 
Value Added Tax. For the rest of the taxes it is 
mentioned that reductions are envisioned, which 
will not be adequate implied without 
supplementary measures. Furthermore, the 
intentions of the government are related to 
keeping a low budget deficit, which means that 
there will be a substantial change in the fiscal 
policy. In the last years some surpluses on the 
consolidated budget have been realized, but it 
seems that the envisioned increases of expenses 
with keeping the relevant size of incomes will 
lead to such deficits. This may have a negative 
impact on economy by displacing the private 
sector, decreasing the trust of foreign investors 
and may have an impact on the stability of the 
monetary fund. 
A basic moment in the Pact is the introduction of 
a rule for increasing the salaries in the economy, 
which should also give an indicative percentage 
for the private sector as well. This idea is an 
attempt for interference of the state in the free 
contracting between employer and employee and 
causes confusion about how the business 
organizations accepted it. Negotiating such 
percentage is pointless, even at branch level, 
because the factors, which are used, like growth 
of GDP, productivity of labor and expenses are 
different for each company, therefore such 
aggregation is inappropriate and there is no need 
for it. 
On the whole, it can be said that most points of 
the Pact lack concreteness either in the 
suggested actions, or in the way of measuring 
their results. The envisioned additional 
documents will probably have the same 
deficiency, as it is characteristic for the 
numerous strategies and programs worked out 
by the executive power. There is uncertainty left 
about to what extent will this pact influence the 
government’s policy during the next 3 years and 
whether only the things which might have 
negative effects won’t be put into practice and 
the Pact – used as an excuse – not clear.  
 
 
 
Europe: Don't Vote with Your Feet Valentin Petkantchin* 
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If you are fed up with paying taxes, you'll 
certainly like the idea of tax competition. It 
gives the opportunity to escape fiscal pressure 
from your own government by eventually 
"voting with your feet" to other jurisdictions 
with more favourable tax regimes. And it gives 
strong incentives for governments elsewhere to 
lower their own taxes. 
Luxembourg for example is considered as a "tax 
heaven" in the heart of Europe, benefiting not 
only European but also world taxpayers. 
But some governments are trying, through the 
European Commission, to impose tax 
harmonisation across Europe. For example, 
Brussels has issued a sanction against 
Luxembourg for its preferential tax regime 
pertaining to holding companies. Luxembourg is 
being called to task essentially because 
companies there can be exempted from income 
tax, which is not the case in other EU member 
states. 
The Commission says the scheme "distorts 
competition and trade by altering the level 
playing field". Brussels also regards this as 
"state aid" and as "a harmful tax measure". In its 
view, tax systems in Europe have to be 
harmonized in the name of free competition. 
But the argument that tax relief may pose a 
threat to free competition and that we need tax 
harmonisation is senseless. 
The Commission has a very strange concept of 
free competition, with an absence of tax pressure 
defined as "state aid". It is easy to grasp how 
public subsidies to business - which involves 
confiscating resources from some parties and 
giving them to others - should be regarded as 
assistance that runs counter to free competition. 
But how can the fact that certain taxes are not 
levied be placed on the same footing? 
Tax relief indicates that government is actually 
leaving wealth in the hands of its creators, 
without this constituting assistance. Does the 
fact that someone is not trying to trip you up 
mean that he is helping you walk? Similarly, it is 
absurd to suggest that if some companies are not 
paying income tax they are being "assisted" by 
government. And even if - by twisting the 
meaning of words - it is deemed that this really 
does amount to assistance, it would be the only 
"state aid" compatible with free competition 
because it respects property rights.  
If we support this harmonisation logic, we will 
inevitably be led to attack other tax regimes that 
benefit taxpayers. In Estonia, for example, 
undistributed corporate profits - and not just the 
profits of holding companies, as in Luxembourg 
- are simply not taxed. When can we expect the 
repeal of the Estonian system, which has 
contributed to the economic dynamism of this 
East European country? 
Pursuing the harmonization moves undertaken 
by Brussels may result in greater tax pressures 
on everyone. If the Commission truly wished to 
promote free competition, it should have 
suggested having tax relief of the sort provided 
in Luxembourg and Estonia apply all across the 
EU. Or it ought simply to let tax competition 
play out in Europe. This remains an unrivalled 
way of encouraging governments to reduce the 
tax pressure weighing down taxpayers' 
purchasing power and European companies' 
competitiveness. It is also a means of creating 
greater economic prosperity. 
---------------------- 
* The author is a researcher with the Institut 
économique Molinari., (The article is published in 
TCS Daily on 17 of October 2006) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
